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Abstract: The seminal credit market model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) proposes that asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders creates a moral hazard in which borrowers to have an 
incentive to invest in risky projects, creating the basis for a rationing equilibrium in credit markets.  Other 
recent behavioral work, argues that a different type of behavior is more central to credit market risk: the 
temptation for borrowers to use borrowed capital to meet short-term consumption needs rather than for 
productive investment (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010).  In this note, we present a simple model that is 
able to explain credit rationing where present-bias, rather than an incentive to undertake risky projects, 
characterizes the root source of risk under asymmetric information in credit markets.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The credit rationing model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is one of the most celebrated theoretical 
papers in all of economics, and has arguably shaped the views of economists about the nature of 
credit markets more than any other single piece of research.1   Their model presents a type of moral 
hazard in which borrowers, due to a convex payoff function over returns, have an incentive to invest 
in risky projects over safer ones.  This incentive is at odds with the interests of lenders, who, given 
their concave payoff function over borrower returns, would prefer borrowers to invest in safer 
projects to increase the probability of loan repayment.  In their model, riskier borrowers are willing 
to pay higher interest rates because they realize high rates of return in the good states of nature, but 
are insulated from losses under joint liability in the bad state of nature.  Credit rationing occurs 
because lenders have an incentive to keep interest rates at sub-market-clearing levels in order to 
bring safer projects back into the pool.   
This “risky-versus-safe project” framework in the Stiglitz and Weiss model has served as an 
underpinning for a tremendous amount of  work in development economics, such as Ray (1997), 
Bardhan and Udry (1999) and especially microfinance Stiglitz (1990), (Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2005; 2010), Ghatak (1999, 2000), Ghatak and Guinnane (2001), Armendáriz de Aghion, and Gollier 
(2000), and empirical work such as Wenner (1995), Wydick (1999), and Giné et al. (2010). 
 Recent empirical work in behavioral economics, however, has argued that risk in credit 
markets does not originate in a borrower incentive to intentionally invest in risky projects, but in a 
set of  behavioral issues related to self-control   Work such as Ashraf  et al. (2006), Bertrand et al. 
(2005), and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) points to the temptation to consume borrowed rather 
than invest borrowed capital as being primal to the risk that lenders face in credit markets.  Indeed in 
a companion paper to this research, Zeballos et. al. (2012) find in a series of  experiments with 200 
Bolivian microfinance borrowers that real-world members of  defaulting borrowing groups are 
significantly less likely to invest in risky projects than members of  borrowing groups with excellent 
repayment records, and more likely to make “safe” experimental choices associated with 
consumption.  Other non-experimental empirical work, such as McIntosh et al. (2011) finds that 
among a sample of  microfinance borrowers who had taken loans officially for business investment, 
the likelihood that a household purchases a television set purchase rose by more than a third in the 
first year they took a microfinance loan.  
                                                 
1 A search for the paper in Google Scholar shows Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) to have 9,192 citations by other papers and 
books.  The paper has had a profound impact in the field of  microfinance, where a similar search finds 1,070 papers 
treating the topic of  microfinance citing the Stiglitz and Weiss paper.   
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2.  A SIMPLE MODEL OF CREDIT CONSUMPTION AND CREDIT RATIONING  
 We present here a simple principal-agent model of  credit rationing in which the focus of 
moral hazard endemic to credit markets lies not substantially in the temptation to undertake risky 
projects, but rather around issues surrounding the temptation to consume rather than invest, even 
when investment may yield a potentially high future return.  Like a propensity for risk-taking, an 
individual borrower’s degree of  temptation to consume a loan rather than invest it productively is 
information that is asymmetric between borrowers and lenders.  Our model is thus rooted in the 
behavioral framework of  Laibson (1997), Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2004), and Banerjee and 
Mullainathan (2010).  The core of  the model manifests what this and other recent research has come 
to regard as a central issue between lenders and borrowers in developing country settings:  the 
tension between the temptation for borrowers to use any available liquidity to meet (often dire) 
present consumption needs, and the substantial future returns that may be realized from productive 
investment in the informal enterprise (de Mel, McKensie and Woodruff, 2008).     
 Consider a market of  lenders who lend one unit of  capital to risk-neutral borrowers.  The 
cost of  capital to lenders plus the one unit of  principal is equal to 𝑐.  The one unit of  principal plus 
borrower interest is due in the future period and is equal to 𝑟.  Borrowers face two decisions which 
correspond to participation and incentive constraints in the standard principal-agent framework:  
First agents must decide whether or not to borrow one unit of  capital.  If  they abstain from 
borrowing, agents receive a reservation payoff  equal to zero in the present and v in the future 
period.  But if  agents opt to borrow, borrowers must then choose between consuming the unit of  
capital in order to receive a payoff  equal to 1 today, and investing the unit of  capital, which will yield 
a net utility of  𝑅 − 𝑟 in the future period.  The parameter 𝜃𝑖 = 1 + 𝛿𝑖, where 𝛿𝑖 > 0 reflects a 
borrower’s present bias, which favors present-day consumption of  borrowed capital over investment 
of  that capital in favor of  future return.   (Note that because our model only consists of  two 
periods, 𝜃𝑖 is also consistent with the standard neo-classical discounting framework, in which 𝛿𝑖 may 
be interpreted as an individual discount rate.)  Multiplying each of  the three terms by 𝜃𝑖 yields 
borrower i's utility function:  
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑣,  𝜃𝑖, 𝑅 − 𝑟}    (1)  
 In this model we abstract from ex-post issues of  moral hazard; if  investment occurs, a 
project is always successful, yields the gross return R, and the lender is repaid.  If  utilities are equal 
between decisions, assume an agent will first borrow and invest (satisfy both participation and 
incentive constraints), second borrow and consume (satisfy participation, but not the incentive 
constraint), and last abstain from borrowing (fail to satisfy the participation constraint). 
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 Equation (1) implies that the participation constraint will be satisfied (an agent will accept a 
loan) if   
     𝑅 − 𝑟 ≥ 𝑣      (2) 
            or   𝜃 ≥ 𝑣       (3) 
The incentive constraint will be satisfied (a borrower will invest borrowed capital) if   
     𝑅 − 𝑟 ≥ 𝜃.      (4) 
Let 𝜃𝑖 ∈ (1, 𝑅], and the distribution of 𝜃𝑖 be continuous and uniform across the set of  potential 
borrowers.  Furthermore, let the function 𝑓(𝑟) be the fraction of  the set of  borrowers who satisfy 
the incentive constraint in (4) given that they satisfy the participation constraint in (2) and (3), noting 
that 𝑓′(𝑟) < 0.  Thus 𝑓(𝑟) becomes the repayment rate, which is declining in 𝑟, since as the lender’s 
interest rate increases, it draws more borrowers into the pool that satisfy the participation constraint 
in (2) (for whom 𝜃 ≥ 𝑣), but , violating who violate the incentive constraint in (4), (i.e. for whom  
𝜃 > 𝑅 − 𝑟).  We assume lenders maximize the profit function, 
    𝜋 = (𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑓(𝑟) − 𝑐(1 − 𝑓(𝑟))    (5) 
where differentiating (5) with respect to the interest rate yields  
    
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑟
= 𝑓(𝑟) + 𝑟𝑓′(𝑟).      (6)  
Notice that when the interest rate is low, (6) is positive, but at higher interest rates (6) becomes 
negative as 𝑓(𝑟) goes to zero.  The incentive constraint given in (4) and uniform distribution of  
𝜃𝑖 implies that 𝑓(𝑟) =
𝑅−𝑟
𝑅
, so that lender profits in (5) are maximized at  ?̂? =
1
2
𝑅.   
FIGURE 1 provides a mapping of  the satisfaction of  participation and incentive constraints 
in (𝑟, 𝜃𝑖) space. As shown in FIGURE 1, as the interest rate increases, the dotted line showing the 
fraction of  borrowers repaying their loans, 𝑓(𝑟) decreases as the participation constraint continues 
to be satisfied, but higher interest rates induce more borrowers to divert loans into present 
consumption from investment that would yield returns in the future. 
The most problematic borrowers, from a lender’s perspective, are located in the “Nevada-
shaped” area that lies in the northeastern section of  the map where present bias is high.  In this case 
the participation constraint is satisfied (so that borrowers take loans at any interest rate), but they 
consume capital instead of  investing it, not allowing them to generate the future liquidity needed to 
repay loans.  To the northwest of  this lies a triangular area in which 𝜃𝑖 is lower such that neither 
participation nor incentive constraints are satisfied as the payoff  to these borrowers from 
consuming loans is lower.  Below this area in the west part of  the map is the complementary 
triangular area in which 𝜃𝑖 is lower, and the incentive constraint becomes satisfied, but high 𝑟 makes 
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it such that the participation constraint remains unsatisfied—borrowers favor their reservation 
payoff  𝑣 over the future benefits of  borrowing and investing.  The southwest area of  the map 
contains the area in which both the participation constraint and incentive constrains are satisfied; 𝑟 is 
low enough to induce these agents into borrowing, and 𝜃𝑖 is low enough that as borrowers they 
invest the borrowed capital rather than consume it.   
  We present three examples of  credit rationing equilibria under different formulations of  the 
model that we believe are relevant to credit markets in developing countries.  The present-bias based 
model generates similar credit rationing phenomena to the Stiglitz and Weiss model, but with 
stronger behavioral foundations.  We also believe the model is more applicable to important issues in 
credit markets in developing countries and serves as a stronger theoretical framework for thinking 
about important issues in microfinance. 
 EXAMPLE 1: CREDIT MARKET RATIONING UNDER FULLY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION.   
 The demand and supply curves for credit in FIGURE 2 are derived from (1) through (6) and 
can be related to FIGURE 1.  The demand curve consists of  two vertical segments.  At high interest 
rates, where 𝑟 > 𝑅 − 𝑣, the participation constraint is satisfied only for agents who would borrow to 
consume.  As the interest rate decreases to 𝑟 ≤ 𝑅 − 𝑣, agents with less present bias are drawn into 
the borrowing pool, those who would choose to invest borrowed capital.   
The supply curve reflects the first-order condition in (6).  It is positively sloped at low 𝑟, but 
then at  ?̂? takes a negative slope at the interest rate at which lender profits reach a maximum. Parallel 
to Stiglitz and Weiss, we assume that if  the supply of  funds is commensurate with the return earned 
by lenders on loans, then the supply curve (as seen in FIGURE 2) will be upward sloping as long as 
lender profits increase with higher interest rates (equation (6) > 0), but turn downward-sloping when 
higher interest rates create a lower return on loans (equation (6) < 0).  The interest rate at which the 
supply curve bends backward is at ?̂?, the first-order condition implied when (6) is set equal to zero.  
This creates the possibility of  an interior optimum interest rate for lenders under which 
credit rationing occurs at the interest rate ?̂?.   Notice that this credit rationing interest rate is lower 
than the Walrasian market clearing interest rate at r* in FIGURE 2.  As in the Stiglitz and Weiss risky-
projects model, an interior interest rate optimum for lenders does not guarantee credit rationing, but 
is sufficient for credit rationing if  the interior solution is less than the market clearing level of  
interest, as in FIGURE 2.  This credit rationing equilibrium mirrors the credit rationing equilibrium in 
Stiglitz and Weiss' THEOREM 5.  As shown in FIGURE 2, a fraction 𝜙 among a group of  
observationally indistinguishable individuals receive a loan, while some fraction 1 − 𝜙  do not.  
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EXAMPLE 2: CREDIT MARKET RATIONING OVER OBSERVATIONALLY DISTINGUISHABLE 
BORROWERS. 
The model is easily extended to reflect a more common situation of  partial informational 
asymmetry, whereby a lender can identify sub-populations of  agents who present a greater credit 
risk than others.  In this example, suppose some fraction  of  potential borrowers are blue and that 
1 -  are red, a trait observable to lenders.  To simplify, let 𝑣 equal zero, and suppose 𝜃𝑖 is restricted to 
only two values where 𝜃𝑖 ∈ {1, 𝜃𝐻} and 𝜃𝐻 > 𝑅.  A fraction dR of  reds are characterized by 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 
and the remaining fraction (1 – dR) have 𝜃𝑖 = 0.  Blues are observed by lenders to be better investors 
on average, where a fraction dB < dR have 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻, and (1 – dB) > (1 – dR) have 𝜃𝑖 = 1.  Thus (4) 
never holds for a total fraction equal to  of  borrowers (red and blue) for any 𝑟 > 0, so 
that the participation constraint is always satisfied and the incentive constraint is never satisfied.  
These borrowers always demand loans at any interest rate, consume their unit of  capital and default 
on their loan.  The complementary fraction of  agents  will always invest if  
they borrow, but they will only obtain loans when the payoff  to borrowing and investing is positive, 
i.e. if  the interest rate falls to at least  𝑅 − 𝑣.   
 In FIGURE 3 we show a credit rationing equilibrium with observationally different groups of  
borrowers that has the following characteristics:  Assuming that the blue borrowers are profitable, or  
𝜋𝐵 = (𝑟 − 𝑐)[1 − (𝑑𝐵)] − 𝑐𝑑𝐵 ≥ 0, then blue borrowers will be offered credit at a competitive (zero-
profit, but not market clearing) interest rate equal to  ?̂?𝐵 =
𝑐
1−𝑑𝐵
 .  A fraction dB of  blues will default. 
If  dR is sufficiently high, then  𝜋𝑅 = (𝑟 − 𝑐)[1 − (𝑑𝑅)] − 𝑐𝑑𝑅 < 0 for all 𝑟 < 𝑅 − 𝑣 and reds will be 
denied credit.  In this outcome we have credit rationing based on observable characteristics, which in 
the real world may affect groups that might be perceived as having a high present bias, such as 
members of  poor households in developing countries.  Interest rates are kept low enough to draw in 
the low-𝜃 blue agents, who will invest loans productively, but all red agents (even those who would 
like to borrow at the prevailing “market” rate and would invest capital productively) are denied credit 
at any interest rate. 
EXAMPLE 3: RATIONING WITH MULTIPLE CREDIT MARKETS INCLUDING MICROFINANCE. 
Consider the previous set-up in EXAMPLE 2, but where new lending technology makes it 
possible to offer profitable contracts to red borrowers.  Some of  the now well-known technologies 
such as the skilled use of  group lending and credit officer incentive contracts, dynamic incentives, 
and microfinance credit reporting systems can reduce default rates and allow for more cost-efficient 
   1RB dd
    RB dd  111 
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lending to the poor.  Group training sessions with borrowers before lending and the esprit de corps of  
credit groups may shift preferences away from satisfying short-term needs and toward investment.  
Some combination of  these innovations may facilitate an equilibrium in which red borrowers get 
credit, albeit at a higher interest rate than blue borrowers.   
In this example we have credit rationing at ?̂?𝐵 =
𝑐
1−𝑑𝐵
, where both red and blue borrowers 
would like to borrow at the blue interest-rate.   Red borrowers are offered loans only at the higher 
interest rate, ?̂?𝑅 =
𝑐
1−𝑑𝑅
,  as in FIGURE 4.  This kind of  market segmentation is common in 
developing countries, where wealthy borrowers and those with sufficient collateral to cover large 
loans are able to borrow at lower formal-sector rates.  The poor and informal sector entrepreneurs 
are traditionally given credit from traditional money lenders at much higher rates.  Yet even with the 
current innovations in microfinance, these borrowers pay microloan interest rates that are often two 
to three times those offered by the formal financial sector. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Why propose an alternative model of  credit rationing if  a new model built around present bias and 
the temptations of  consumption yields similar results, i.e. credit rationing equilibria similar to the 
ones in the “risky-project-based” moral hazard? That the risky-project-based framework has 
enhanced our understanding of  credit market failure does not necessarily render it a suitable 
framework for building applied models of  credit markets and designing appropriate policies for 
microfinance.   
 Much of  the more recent literature investigating credit market issues in developing countries 
and microfinance has argued that self-control issues, nudges, and reference points lie at the heart of  
savings and borrowing behavior (Bertrand et al., 2005; Ashraf  et al., 2006; Gugerty, 2007). We have 
constructed a model that generates credit rationing on the stronger behavioral foundations of  this 
new literature rather than on assumptions about credit market behavior that appear to be 
unsupported by recent empirical work. Further work that incorporates behavioral economics into its 
research methodology will lead to the development of  more robust models that not only allow us to 
understand the operations of  markets, but can be used to guide important policy questions faced by 
development practitioners.   
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Figure 2: Credit Rationing Equilibrium 
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Figure 4:  Rationing with Two Identifiable Markets 
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